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 During the last decade, with the advent of multiple acts of terrorism 
perpetrated by Al Qaeda and other global militant networks, it has 
become clear that classical just-war theory does not give very clear 
directives-even in the unlikely event that leaders of threatened 
peoples would care to consult JWT before determining their response! 
The traditional paradigm for JWT envisions a conclusion, by a 
threatened nation, that a hostile nation or hostile nations are gathering 
forces against it. This conclusion may be based either on clandestine 
intelligence or overt acts of aggression. Calculations are then made by 
the threatened nation: Is there a bona fide threat, or is it mere 
bluffing or chest-thumping? Have all diplomatic means been explored 
to defuse the threat? Will military defense possibly cause more 
damage than succumbing to the aggressors? Have proper procedures, 
in a democratic and constitutional system of government, been 
followed for engaging in war? Then, if these considerations for jus ad 
bellum have been satisfactorily answered, and hostilities are begun, 
subsequent questions about conduct during war, jus in bello, must be 
addressed: Noncombatants must be distinguished from combatants; 
prisoners of war must be dealt with in a just manner; pillaging, 
massacres, and torture must be avoided by the defending forces.  
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Such ethical guidelines concerning war would be difficult or 
impossible to adhere to, in many contemporary situations. Terrorism 
rather than traditional war-making has become the strategy of choice 
by peoples or groups either unable to mobilize conventionally enough 
force, or possibly considering terrorism more effective, because of a 
"David vs. Goliath" military perspective. Terrorist attacks extend the 
idea of guerrilla warfare to its ultimate limits, "pulling out all stops" to 
confound, demoralize, defeat, and even exterminate the enemy. When 
terrorism is adopted as the strategy of choice, it is to the advantage of 
the terrorists to studiously avoid having any unified identifiable hostile 
force, or being situated in some specific geographical location, or even 
being linked with a specific nation. Forces that are organized, 
uniformed, and marching under a flag, and thus identifiable, are out of 
the question; weaponry (or the lack of it) must be a matter of 
guessing by the other side. And terrorist threats must always be as 
vague as possible, with no clear verifiable danger to the military forces 
of the enemy. The result optimally will be complete confusion by the 
enemy as to which specific civilian or military persons or groups on 
their side could be subject to attack, and need to be defended–no 
matter how just a defense would be. In other words, the imperative 
need to defend would be coupled with complete uncertainty as to what 
needs to be defended. But to defend everything is, of course, 
impossible.  
In past decades, when the MAD strategy of the Cold War 
between the United States and the Soviet Union prevailed, the vague 
threats of total nuclear annihilation were thought to serve as a 
deterrent, on the presupposition that the enemy would be logical and 
non-suicidal. But this presupposition, if it ever made sense, can no 
longer be taken for granted. The clandestine leader of a terrorist 
nation or worldwide network might be willing to risk certain retaliation 
on his subjects or collaborators–and even himself. The consequences 
could be madness in a literal sense, extrapolated to global dimensions.  
A complicating factor in trying to apply just war theory is that 
each side typically considers itself justified. But even if the jus ad 
bellum conditions could be satisfied for terrorists, it is unthinkable that 
jus in bello could be maintained. Random massacres of men, women, 
and children of a targeted group contradict instincts of justice and 
fairness in almost any moral and legal context. And the wholesale 
abandonment of considerations of justice becomes particularly acute in 
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the case of suicide bombing. Occasionally apologists compare suicide 
bombing to heroic acts which sometimes take place in war, where a 
soldier will sacrifice his life, e.g. by falling on a live grenade, to save 
his comrades. But there is no similarity. The suicide bomber is not 
defending comrades, but participating in a nihilistic act of annihilation 
both for himself and his targets, which usually or frequently consist of 
noncombatants–even noncombatants who might sympathize with his 
or her cause.  
When questions are raised about the morality of suicide 
bombing, justifications are given: These are acts of desperation by 
oppressed peoples, driven to extreme defensive measures; and, 
morality aside, there are supervening religious considerations, edicts 
and mandates by respected religious leaders who encourage and 
praise such acts as "martyrdom" leading to especially enticing 
heavenly rewards in the afterlife. And when confronted with the 
question of the murder of innocent noncombatants, the apologists for 
suicide bombing will often assert that in their special struggle, there 
are no "noncombatants." In the case of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, 
the argument is that the enemy, Israel, is a militaristic country, 
completely mobilized, whose military "force" includes all males and 
females, young and old–all of whom perpetuate and assure, in various 
ways, according to their capacities, the oppression of Palestinians; 
even children are future combatants. Incidents against the United 
States, such as the massacre of September 11, 2001, are claimed to 
be ultimate and necessary extensions of the terrorist strategy–the U.S. 
being "fair game," since it is the ally offering indispensable support for 
Israel's continuing aggression. In short, the extermination of a whole 
population (the perpetrators would never use the term, "genocide") 
can be justified in this manner: Children are seen as future enemies to 
the existence and progress of the oppressed people; noncombatant 
adults and even the elderly can be portrayed as ideological proponents 
of further hostilities, or at the minimum as "fellow travelers"; and the 
constant threats of random acts of terror may interfere so drastically 
with normal living patterns and be so impermeable to ordinary military 
approaches, that the enemy will eventually leave the disputed 
territories willy-nilly.  
The infractions of natural law in suicide-bombing strategy are 
almost intuitively obvious, requiring very little argument or painstaking 
theoretical applications: The most intuitively relevant principle, of 
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course, is the "law of self-preservation," which inculcates a strong 
responsibility for maintaining one's own life, as well as the inalienable 
right to do so, and to continue living. It takes no great efforts at 
ratiocination to see that this law also implies a responsibility for not 
taking the life of others, as well as the right not to be threatened with 
extermination by others. The natural law of preserving the species is 
also relevant; it is certainly in the background of the general 
consensus of civilized people against genocide. A person who asks, 
"so, what's wrong with genocide (or "ethnic cleansing") is simply not 
on an ethical plane at all, and certainly manifesting symptoms of 
ethical imbecility. Finally the natural law of acting rationally, and 
extending this tendency to creating and maintaining rational social 
interrelationships, is probably the most important tenet of the natural 
law relevant to the case of suicide bombing, and the law most 
seriously threatened by the infractions of suicide bombers. Progress in 
the history of civilizations has only been possible by continual 
extensions of rational social interaction, superseding the inevitable 
dynamics of power, greed, aggrandizement, selfishness, and vanity.  
Suicide bombing seems to constitute such an outrageous 
infraction of natural law that one wonders how fellow humans, sharing 
the same nature, could possibly embrace it in all its nihilistic 
overtones. Natural-law arguments, and any universal moral 
considerations, are relevant as challenges to politically-motivated 
suicide bombers, such as the Tamil separatists in Sri Lanka or the 
female resistance fighters in Chechnya. But morality is considered 
irrelevant by those who feel they have a religious mandate to commit 
such acts, such as Islamicist proponents of suicide bombing–including 
even many Muslim academicians. In a tradition like the modern 
Western tradition, which recognizes the distinction between ethics and 
religion, and the distinction between politics and religion, an ethicist 
might get a hearing. But in the eyes of the strict Islamicists who 
defend suicide bombing, there is no such distinction. Islamic law, 
sharia, is final and complete for all time. There is no code of ethics 
which can supplement it; no national or international laws valid in their 
own right, simply as a result of rational deliberation and agreement; 
no political power separate and distinct from religious authority, and 
capable of coordinating and protecting rights of a variety of religious 
persuasions. In short, suicide bombing is a crystal-clear example of 
the problem of a theocracy which becomes identical with morality, law, 
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and politics. If the tenets of this theocracy are irrational and immoral, 
this is not an argument against it; it is not subject to reexamination or 
criticism based on rational considerations.  
In the context of Western philosophy and ethics, the problem of 
suicide bombing can best be considered as a subset of the larger 
problem of the relationship of ethics to religion and vice versa: Does a 
religion have a right to enjoin acts which are irrational and immoral? 
Or does the religious person have the converse right–even a God-
given right–to analyze the tenets of a religion for conformity to reason, 
and to resolutely discountenance any religious directives which go 
clearly against reason and ethics? Historically, and even at present, 
religions have justified or even recommended blatant infractions of the 
natural law-child sacrifice, female genital mutilation, cannibalism, 
ritual suicide of widows, as well as genocidal destruction of all other 
religions. If such practices are authoritatively justified by a religion, 
and not just attributable to the excesses of individuals, can and should 
a rational observer come to the conclusion that that religion is ipso 
facto invalid, not divinely inspired, but to be resolutely avoided and 
discountenanced?  
The locus classicus for this problematic in the Judaeo-Christian 
tradition is of course the case in Genesis 22:2, in which Yahweh 
commands Abraham to slay his son, Isaac, and Abraham 
unquestioningly prepares to perform the act, being prevented only by 
a divinely-sent last-minute angelic reprieve. Jewish and Christian 
philosophers and theologians have wrestled for over two millennia with 
this story and their responses range from Kant's rejection of the 
authenticity of the story (since of course God would never command 
anything unethical like murder) to Kierkegaard's interpretation in 
terms of the "teleological suspension of the ethical" by faith (leading to 
a relativization of even ethics and rationality in face of the absolute 
divine "paradox"). Thomas Aquinas, most of whose life-long efforts 
were directed at showing the compatibility of faith and reason, in 
response to the objection that God's command to kill Isaac is against 
the natural law, answers that such a situation would be a "limiting 
case" for natural law: if God, the author of nature and life, commands 
someone to be killed, it is no longer unnatural or immoral; he argues 
in the same vein regarding other Old Testament narratives in which 
God commands the Israelites to steal from the Egyptians (Exodus 
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12:35), or commands Osee to commit adultery (Osee 1 :2) (See the 
Summa theologiae I-II, q. 94, a. 5, ad 2).  
Even if we agree with Aquinas about the supervening morality of 
a divine command, the ultimate question that arises would be, does 
God really command it? In a previous work, I have argued that a valid 
religious command must pass ethical muster, and that cases such as 
Abraham's willingness to sacrifice Isaac must be understood in terms 
of the evolution of conscience in ancient times (see Ethics in Context, 
Georgetown University Press, 1988, p. 122), which might have 
involved the unconscious projection of divine mandates. In any case 
this may be a challenge strictly relegated to the individual level, 
defying any ethical universalization, a question that must be dealt with 
only rarely by individual prophets or seers–such as Abraham, Joshua, 
Osee, Mohammed, Joan of Arc, Joseph Smith, or (in recent decades) 
the six young people in Medjugorje who claim to have had frequent 
messages from the Virgin Mary. To them, conscience should suggest, 
"is this from God, or from my overactive imagination or my personal 
agenda?"  
Moving from the individual situation to the more universal 
question: what defense can sincere believers (and the human race) 
have against false prophets and mindless religious authorities that 
claim to be passing on a command from God to kill, for example, all 
the members of a certain ethnic group, or religion, or to carry out 
other abominable acts? Certainly the "grammar of assent" for religious 
commitment would include a more than cursory examination of natural 
law. And if there are degrees of unnaturalness and immorality, 
certainly a religion whose recognized authorities preach "kill, kill, kill" 
has gone beyond the possible parameters of the individual exceptions 
Aquinas defends, and must be rejected by any thinking person.  
A major danger is that we who consider ourselves tolerant and broad-
minded should come to view suicidal acts splattering all bystanders to 
pieces as just one more legitimate expression of religious faith–an act 
given extra legitimation by stressful political and military realities. The 
shudder that we feel in extending this line of thought to its limits is 
normal, understandable, nothing to be ashamed of, a sign that religion 
and sanity are not contradictory. 
 
